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I. Introduction
Jeremy Greenwood and his collaborators have been instrumental in
highlighting the “second industrial revolution” that occurred within
households. The key insight is that “engines of liberation,” such as wash-
ing machines, microwave ovens, and prepackaged food, freed women
from lives of domestic drudgery. Once you notice this revolution in
household technology, you cannot help but be astonished by both
how large these technical changes were and how they potentially hold
the key to understanding our changing lives. The research agenda pur-
sued by Greenwood and his collaborators involves sorting out just how
much of twentieth‐century social and economic history can be traced
back to this important driving force. The first paper in this series
(Greenwood, Seshadri, and Yorukoglu 2005) argued that it can account
for the dramatic changes over recent decades in female labor force par-
ticipation. Subsequent papers in this series argue that this also accounts
for trends in fertility (Greenwood, Seshadri, and Vandenbroucke 2005),
leisure (Greenwood and Vandenbroucke 2008), and now marriage and
divorce. The ideas here are far‐reaching and important, and so my task
is simply to put the contribution of this latest contribution into a some-
what broader context.
In the next section I begin by characterizing the methodology pur-
sued by Greenwood and Guner, noting that the typical metric of “suc-
cess” in this type of exercise—that a sensibly calibrated version of the
model is not inconsistent with the facts—amounts to a failure to falsify
the authors’ model. There is no test here of whether the driving force
suggested by the authors yields a better or worse description than the
many other alternatives. How convincing one finds this failure to falsify
depends on the power of the test offered, and in Section III, I explore
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a model of time allocation within the household, with a search‐based
model of marriage and divorce. However, the two models are not
strongly connected, and almost any driving force would lead the mar-
riage and divorce model to fit the facts; hence the quantitative exercise
cannot be interpreted as a test of whether these engines of liberation are
the driving force behind changing patterns of marriage and divorce. In-
deed, the number of free parameters means that almost any driving
force would predict the observed aggregate marriage and divorce pat-
terns. In Section IV, I suggest some important facts that can be used to
discipline any theory of marriage and divorce. Since the 1970s, theories
have proliferated to explain the large run‐up in divorce—including that




of what has driven changes in American family life (drawing on joint
work with Betsey Stevenson).
This focus also yields a useful separation of labor: the accompanying
comment in this volume by Stefania Albanesi focuses on the link be-
tweenhouseholdtechnologicalchangeandtimeallocation.Mycomments
focus exclusively on the implications of Greenwood and Guner’s model
of marriage and divorce.
II. What Is Being Tested?
The method pursued by Greenwood and Guner is very much in the
tradition of freshwater macro and involves assessing whether a plausi-
bly calibrated version of a model with this driving force can endoge-
nously generate changes in marriage and divorce patterns consistent
with the large shifts experienced since the 1950s. To rephrase this in
the language of falsification, the authors are testing the null hypothesis
that there exists a plausible calibrated model that can connect the sec-
ondindustrialrevolutiontotheobservedchangesineconomicandsocial
life. This paper is a success in that it fails to falsify this null, inviting the
appropriate inference that the “second industrial revolution” remains a
viableexplanationforthechangesinfamilylifeobservedsincethe1950s.
Equally,noassessmentismadeoftherelativepowerofalternativetheo-
ries to explain the observed changes in family life. Moreover, there exists
no shortage of existing explanations, and Stevenson and Wolfers (2007b)
provide a useful summary of plausible explanations, including not only
Wolfers 292the potential of the technological change suggested by Greenwood and
Guner but also reduced labor market discrimination against women; ris-
ing wage inequality; changes in the legal structure of marriage; diffusion
of the pill and access to abortion; changing social norms and sexual
mores; household bargaining; and shifts in matching technology, includ-
ingtheriseofsexuallyintegratedworkplacesand,morerecently,Internet
dating.
Describing the implications of this sort of exercise as a failure to fal-
sify a candidate explanation is not intended as any kind of slight. The
rigorous assessment of the quantitative implications of theories about
changing family life occurs too rarely, and authors rarely do more than
check whether their pet theory generates appropriately signed com-
parative statics. Some of the casual explanations bandied about as
possible drivers of changing family life may well pass that weaker test
b u tb eu n a b l et oe x p l a i nt h el a r g ec h a n g e sw eh a v eo b s e r v e d .T h a t
Greenwood and Guner show that the second industrial revolution
can plausibly explain large changes in marriage and divorce (whereas
other candidate explanations have yet to be shown to meet this thresh-
old) should give one greater confidence that they have isolated a rel-
evant driving force. Equally, it is difficult to be particularly precise
about how much more confident one should feel about this candidate
theory. Bayes’ rule provides some guidance, suggesting that the incre-
ment to one’s confidence that Greenwood and Guner have isolated the
appropriate driving force depends on the number of competing expla-
nations, how much discipline the model offered by Greenwood and
Guner offers, and the probability that a competing explanation would
be rejected by a similar exercise.
A cynic might argue that these exercises almost always “succeed” in
that the author usually concludes by noting that his or her model can
match the relevant facts. In a world in which quantitative theorists very
rarely fail to falsify their models, the failure to falsify one particular
theory contains very little information. Of course, this cynical aside
is unfair to Greenwood and Guner, who do actually go to the trouble
of quantitatively specifying their intuitions, even as authors of compet-
ing theories have failed to do so. Nonetheless, it is worth following
through the implications of the Cynical Bayesian. Perhaps there are five
candidate explanations, one (but only one) of which is “true” (more on
this below), and the true theory is never falsified (i.e., type I errors are
never made). The Cynical Bayesian observed that only about one in five
quantitative theory papers “fails to fit the facts” and hence rejects the
model. Thus, for every five falsification exercises, the true model is
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models. With five candidate theories, a flat prior yields a 20% chance
that one’s pet theory is true; if that theory survives a test with a 75%
chance of a type II error, then the posterior rises to 25%. That is, the
Cynical Bayesian notes that the low rejection rate in quantitative theory
papers suggests that these are low‐power tests.
The fact that this yields any power derives from the fact that the can-
didate list of theories is short, which reflects the implicit assumption
that we are committed to exploringo n l ym o n o c a u s a le x p l a n a t i o n s .
But there is no reason to believe that changes in marriage and divorce
reflect only one driving force. Thus the candidate list of plausible theo-
ries needs to be expanded to include the combination and interaction of
several of these theories. Even if this approach is useful in falsifying a
candidate driving force as a monocausal explanation, it may still be a
crucial part of a multicausal explanation.
Of course, the Cynical Bayesian is taking a shortcut, applying a rate
of type II errors that may be appropriate for the literature as a whole
but not for the contribution of any specific paper. That is, a close read-
ing of a particular research paper may reveal that it offers a particularly
persuasive test of the model, with a particularly high chance of rejecting
the theory if it is in fact false. The next section assesses whether this is
true. The “success” of Greenwood and Guner’s model (or the failure to
falsify it) is described by the authors as follows: “The model’s predic-
tions for the time paths of labor force participation and vital statistics
are compared with the U.S. data. It is found that the developed frame-
work can potentially explain a substantial portion of the rise in divorce,
the fall in marriage, and the increase in married female labor force par-
ticipation that occurred during the later half of the twentieth century.”
However, I shall argue that the implications of Greenwood and Guner’s
model for marriage and divorce behavior come from how they fit a set
of parameters unrelated to changes in household technology. Thus, the
facts about marriage and divorce that the model “explains” could plau-
sibly come from any driving force. (Again, let me stress that this is a
statement about the implications of the model for marriage and di-
vorce; the accompanying comment by Albanesi discusses the other im-
plications about time allocation and labor force allocation.)
III. Understanding the Model
The authors are very clear about their modeling intentions: “a Becker
(1965)–cum–Reid (1934) model of household production is embedded
Wolfers 294into a Mortensen (1988) style spousal‐search model.” This description is
accurate, although the extent to which the spousal‐search model is truly
“embedded” is debatable. Indeed, it is the fact that the two models are
only weakly connected that allows me to focus this comment on the
search (marriage and divorce) model. In particular, the implications
of the time allocation model are entirely independent of the model of
marriage and divorce, a point that I now turn to illustrating, by writing
down a stripped‐down version of their search‐based model of marriage
and divorce.
1
The authors identify two reasons to marry, match‐specific marital
bliss (bi) and scale economies in consumption, which they describe in
terms of a fixed cost of maintaining a household, c, and an equivalence
scale parameter, ϕ. The details of these scale economies are not particu-
larly important, so I simplify, summarizing both of these benefits of
marriage in terms of their equivalent variation, c. Thus, the per‐period
utility functions are
Usingle ¼ UðCsingleÞð 1Þ
and
Umarried ¼ UðCsingle þ cÞþbi; ð2Þ
where Csingle denotes spending on consumption goods by a single.
Each period, a single person meets a potential partner, who would
bring some degree of marital bliss in the next period were they to marry.
That is,marriageyieldsaguaranteedpayoffduringthehoneymoonyear
(known prior to the decision to marry), and this payoff is drawn from a
normal distribution
bs ∼ Sðμs; σ2
sÞ: ð3Þ
Once the couple returns from the honeymoon, marital bliss is drawn
from a different normal distribution:
bm ∼ Mðμm; σ2
mÞ: ð4Þ
Equations (3) and (4) embed the essential assumption made by
Greenwood and Guner: marital bliss early in a marriage is drawn from
a different distribution than in the later years of a marriage (see their
Sec. II.C). As we shall see, the former is particularly relevant for decid-
ing whether to continue searching or to get married, whereas the latter
Comment 295is relevant for deciding whether to continue an ongoing marriage or to
divorce. In fact, Greenwood and Guner allow a more complicated process
in which marital bliss evolves through time according to an autoregres-
sive process; but in order to focus on what is essential here, the above
equation focuses on the special case of their setup in which last period’s
blissisirrelevant(andhenceintheirnotation,ρ ¼ 0).Aswillbeclear,this
is not essential to my conclusions.
This setup yields the usual “reservation wage” type decision rules:
singles should marry if they find a partner who yields a sufficiently
high level of marital bliss, and married couples should divorce if they
obtain a sufficiently bad draw for the quality of married life next year.
Consequently, the marriage rate will be equal to the proportion of the
single population who find an acceptable spouse each period, whereas
the divorce rate will depend on the proportion of couples who draw a
sufficiently bad outcome:
marry if bs > b 
s ⇒ marriage rate ¼ 1   Sðb 
s; μs; σsÞ; ð5Þ
divorce if bm < b 
m ⇒ divorce rate ¼ Mðb 
m; μm; σmÞ: ð6Þ
Moreover, the greater the advantage of married life over single life (re-
call that this is parameterized by c), the lower the marriage and divorce
cutoffs should be, since it is relatively more attractive to either get or


























where uppercase letters denote cumulative density functions (cdfs)
and lowercase letters represent the corresponding probability density
functions.
All told, the model has four free parameters (describing the distribu-
tions from which bliss during a honeymoon or marriage is drawn), and
it has one driving force, c. How are these parameters chosen? The driv-
ing force, c, comes from the time allocation part of the model, which I
have not discussed at all. Thus, in my simplified version of the mar-
riage and divorce model, we can simply treat the decline in the value
of marriage as a primitive. The four other parameters, μs, σs, μm, and
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marriage rate, divorce rate, and fraction married, in the 1950 steady state
andagainin2000.Becausetheabilityofthemodeltofitthesebasicfactsis
used as a rough “test” of its explanatory power, it is worthdescribingthe
mapping between the free parameters and these moments in a bit more
detail.
The first two facts that the authors wish to match are the marriage
rates in 1950 and 2000. But note from equation (5) that the steady‐state
marriage rate is determined by the cdf of the honeymoon distribution,
and so the 1950 marriage rate is given by Sðb 
sðc1950ÞÞ. By 2000, there has
been a shock lowering the value of marriage to c2000, which equation (7)
suggests will make singles somewhat pickier, raising their cutoff from
b 
sðc1950Þ to b 
sðc2000Þ, and this in turn will lower the marriage rate to
Sðb 
sðc2000ÞÞ. Hence the change in the marriage rate depends on the dis-
tribution of marital bliss drawn from the honeymoon distribution, Sð Þ.
Both the mean and variance of this distribution are free parameters, im-
plying that for any decline in the value of marriage (c), an appropriate
choice of μs and σs can match both the initial 1950 marriage rate and its
change to its level in 2000.
The next two facts to match are the divorce rate (again in 1950 and
2000), and a similar logic applies, although divorce decisions are driven
by the distribution of marital bliss for the next year rather than honey-
moon bliss. Equation (6) shows that the divorce rate is determined by
the cdf of the distribution of marital bliss, and hence the 1950 divorce
rate is given by Mðb 
mðc1950ÞÞ. Equation (8) suggests that a shock lower-
ing the value of married life will lower the bar for divorce from b 
mðc1950Þ
to b 
mðc2000Þ, which will raise the divorce rate to Mðb 
sðc2000ÞÞ. Hence the
change in the divorce rate depends on the distribution of marital bliss
drawn from the posthoneymoon distribution, Mð Þ.A g a i n ,b o t ht h e
mean and variance of this distribution are free parameters, implying
that for any decline in the value of marriage (c), an appropriate choice
of μm and σm can yield predicted values of the steady‐state divorce rate
consistent with the data.
With this understanding in hand, it is worth making a few comments
on what this exercise reveals.
A. This Is Not Really a Test of the “Engines of Liberation” Hypothesis
In the simple version of the model described above, the driving force is
a decline in the value of married life relative to single life, parameter-
ized by c. I have been deliberately imprecise about where this comes
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down by the authors suggests one possible source: laborsaving techno-
logical progress in the household sectorcan—undercertainconditions—
explain why the value of marriage declined. Equally, there are many
competing explanations, also mediated by a declining value of marriage.
For instance, reduced stigma about premarital sex may reduce the value
ofmarriage.Declininglabormarketdiscriminationagainstwomenraises
the opportunity cost of household specialization, reducing the value of
marriage. The pill changed the consequences of premarital sex, reducing
the value of marriage as insurance against unintended pregnancy. Con-
tinuing financial development has reduced the role of families as pro-
viders of credit. Easier access to divorce may reduce the value of formal
marriagecomparedwith cohabitation. Therise ofprenuptial agreements
also reduces the value of the default state‐sanctioned marriage contract,
now that alternative contractual forms are easily accessed. Indeed, con-
servativesevenarguethattheriseofgaymarriagesomehowundermines
the value of heterosexual marriage.
Any of these factors could be driving the decline in c, which is suffi-
cient for the model to deliver higher divorce and lower marriage rates.
Of course, proponents of these alternative stories have not been as care-
ful as Greenwood and Guner in quantifying just how much their pet
theory yields a decline in the value of marriage. Unfortunately in this
setting, the quantification of Δc does not really change the ability of the
estimated marriage and divorce model to fit the facts, since the four free
parameters in the search model can easily match data on actual mar-
riage and divorce rates in 1950 and 2000 no matter how large Δc is.
As such, any decline in the value of marriage would yield estimated
parameters that quite effectively match these key facts.
B. Why Doesn’t the Model Exactly Fit the Facts?
As described above, the model can take any decline in the value of mar-
riage, Δc, and use the four free parameters to pin down the marriage
and divorce rates in 1950 and 2000. In turn, these flow variables are ar-
guments determining the steady‐state fraction married (a stock). Thus it
may not be clear why the model does not exactly fit the major facts. The
key here is to realize that the free parameters are being estimated so as
to maximize the match between the model and six facts, with the fifth
and sixth facts being the fraction married in 1950 and 2000.
Thus the next fact to match is the fraction married in the 1950 steady
state.However,bytheusualstock‐flowrelationships,thefractionmarried
Wolfers 298in the steady state is simply a function of the aforementioned marriage




marriage rate þ divorce rate þ mortality rate
¼
1   Sðb 
sðc1950ÞÞ
½1   Sðb 
sðc1950ÞÞ þ Mðb 
sðc1950ÞÞ ð1   δÞþδ
: ð9Þ
Giventhatthemodelmatchesthemarriageanddivorceratesin1950,it
is only the auxiliary assumptions embedded in equation (9) that might
lead to some mismatch between the model and the fraction married that
we observe in the data. The first auxiliary assumption concerns the mor-
tality rate,which iscalibrated imposinganaveragelife expectancyforan
adult of 47 years. This value is certainly reasonable, although is worth
noting that the authors do not allow this parameter to change between
1950 and 2000, despite large declines in mortality risk over this period.
Moreover, figure 1 shows that there has been a rather dramatic increase
in the incidence of marriage at later ages, suggesting that declining mor-
tality may explain why the fraction married has not fallen further.
The second auxiliaryassumption comes from the fact that we are com-
paring the model’s steady‐state values with actual data on the fraction
Fig. 1. Fraction of the population currently married, by age, 1900–2006. Sources:
Decennial censuses of 1900, 1950, and 2000; American Community Survey, 2006.
Comment 299married in 1950, which may not be a steady state. Indeed, figure 2 shows
the fraction of all female adults married fluctuating markedly around
1950.Similarly,figure3showslargeswingsinmarriageanddivorcerates
through this period. In fact, plugging the actual marriage and divorce
rates in 1950 plus the assumed mortality rate into equation (9) suggests
that the steady‐state fraction married is 88% whereas the actual fraction
married is 82% (or perhaps lower).
2
Thus it is the failure of these ancillary assumptions that ensures that
theestimationdoesnotsimplypickthevaluesofthefourkeyparameters
thatleadthemodeltoexactlymatchthemarriageanddivorcerates.That
is, asking the model to match the steady‐state fraction married with the
non‐steady‐state data on the fraction married changes the estimated
marriage and divorce parameters, yielding estimates that do not closely
match the marriage and divorce rates. More important, the ability of the
model to match the fraction married in 1950 is not a test of the matching
model, but rather a test of these auxiliary assumptions.
C. Speed of Adjustment
The final fact used to help fit the parameters is the fraction married in
2000. While the model predictions for 1950 reflected the assumption
Fig. 2. Fraction of adult women married, 1880–2005. Sources: Decennial census,
1880–2000; American Community Survey, 2001–5 shown as dashed line.
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dictions for 2000 reflect the dynamic response of the marriage stock to
the assumed changes in the value of marriage. As such, the model’s
predictions for the fraction married in 2000—a stock variable—depend
on the entire history of marriage and divorce rates (or flows) in the in-
tervening period.
The model I have described so far is capable of endogenously gener-
ating a time path for the speed of adjustment of the fraction married,
and this could be used to assess the model’s fit by the year 2000. How-
ever, in my simplified version of the model, there are only two types of
marriages: those in their honeymoon phase, whose “marital bliss” is
drawn from the Sð Þ distribution, and those who have already cele-
brated their first anniversary, whose marital bliss for the next year will
be drawn from the Mð Þ distribution. Because all marriages beyond the
honeymoon are identical, any shock to the value of marriage can cause
fairly rapid changes in the fraction married since all couples receiving a
bad draw will immediately divorce. This likely yields extremely rapid
(too rapid!) adjustment of the fraction married following a shock.
Greenwood and Guner’s model is not so stark. Instead, marital bliss
follows an autoregressive process with a persistence parameter, ρ,
Fig. 3. Marriage and divorce rates in the United States, 1900–2007. Sources: Data for
1900–1919 are from Jacobson (1959); 1920–98 from Carter et al. (2006); 1999–2004 from
U.S. Census Bureau (2007b); 2005–7 from Tejada‐Vera and Sutton (2008).
Comment 301thereby ensuring that the distribution of marital bliss slowly transitions
from being governed by the initial draw from the Sð Þ distribution to
being governed by later draws from the Mð Þ distribution.
3 (I had set
ρ ¼ 0 ,w h i c hi sw h a tg a v et h es t a r kd i v i d eb e t w e e nt h eh o n e y m o o n
period and married life.) The extra parameter delivers some richness
to the model, causing the distribution of marital bliss to depend on the
numberofyearsthat acouplehasbeenmarried.Inturn,thisslows down
the adjustment process, yielding a smoother transition between steady
states.Marriedlifetypicallybeginsfollowinganextremelypositivedraw
from the Sð Þ distribution and in the long run will come to reflect the in-
fluence of repeatedly sampling from the Mð Þ distribution. Between the
honeymoon and this long run is an intermediate period during which
marital bliss stochastically makes its way from the high honeymoon lev-
els to the lower longer‐run levels. Note that these intermediate‐duration
couples typically enjoy greater marital bliss than the long‐duration cou-
ples, yet they still use the same divorce threshold (b 
m); hence the divorce
threshold will be further in the left tail of the distribution of marital bliss.
Thus the divorce rate of these intermediate‐duration couples will be less
sensitive to changes in the value of marriage. High values of ρ thus en-
sure that in the immediate aftermath of a shock to the value of marriage
therearemorecouplesfurtherfromthedivorcethreshold,therebyslowing
down the response of the fraction married. As such, this ρ parameter ef-
fectively governs the speed of adjustment between steady states.
Howdoesthischangeouranalysisonpreviouspages?Itisstillthecase
that for any value of ρ, values of μs, σs, μm, and σm can be chosen (or es-
timated)toperfectlymatchmarriageanddivorceratesinanytwosteady
states.Allthatisnewisthatthefreeparameterρisalsoestimated, allow-
ing the model to also match the rate at which the model shifts between
these steady states.
D. Duration of Marriage
Given the close mapping between the five free parameters (plus the cali-
brated mortality estimate) and the six facts that the matching model is
estimated to fit, it is important to assess the fit of the model on other mo-
ments. The two extra predictions derived from the model are that the
duration of marriage was 31 years in 1950 and 22 years in 2000. Because
marriages can end onlyindivorce ordeath, the “average duration of mar-
riages”inthesteadystateisequaltoðdivorce rate þ mortality rateÞ
 1.Itis
thisstatistic—asimpletransformofthepreviouslydiscusseddivorcerate
and the calibrated mortality risk parameter—that the authors report.
Wolfers 302Once again, if the calibration of the mortality rate is appropriate and
the economy truly is in the steady state, the ability of the model to match
this moment is simply a function of whether the model could match the
divorcerate.Assuch,thesuccessorfailureofthemodeltomatchthedata
islargelyatestofthevalidityofeithertheauxiliarymortalityassumption
or whether the data were generated by a steady state.
One further issue is worth noting. While the steady‐state average mar-
ital duration is well defined within the model, the data that the authors
match are quite different. The eventual duration of marriages occurring
in either 1950 or 2000 will not be known for several decades to come:
many of those couples are still both alive and married and hence still
at risk of divorce. Thus the “data” on marital durations that the authors
match are not in fact data, but projections based on specific assumptions.
Specifically, the authors rely on fairly standard marital life table esti-
mates. These tables typically take the marriage, divorce, widowhood,
and death probabilities for each age group and marital status in a partic-
ularyearandthensimulatethelifecourseforahypotheticalcohort.Thus
the 1950 and 2000 estimates are not in fact based on the life course of
either marriage cohort, but instead are projections based on the past ex-
periencesofevenearliercohorts.These“data”areverydifferentfromthe
moment that Greenwood and Guner generate from their model. One
very simple way out of this mismatch would be for the authors to gen-
erate marital life tables from their model, so that they are comparing like
with like.
IV. Sorting Out the Important Facts
At this point it should be clear that Greenwood and Guner’s model has
enough free parameters to fit most of the facts they identify. Given this,
it would be useful to benchmark their model against a broader set of
stylized facts. I now turn to describing a few of the key stylized facts
that I believe are essential to any compelling explanation of changing
American families.
The first of these facts is simply a more granular assessment of the
time series of the divorce rate. Greenwood and Guner characterize this
time path as if it were a continuous rise, noting that “except for a spike
associated with World War II, the rate of divorce rose more or less con-
tinuously overthelastcenturyfromaboutfour per1,000women in1900,
to about 10 in 1941 (a doubling), to about 23 today (another doubling).”
Stevenson and Wolfers (2007a) describe the belief that divorce has been
continuously rising as “the great divorce myth,” noting that the divorce
Comment 303rate peaked in 1979 and has subsequently fallen by one‐third. Moreover,
this is not simply an artifact of declining marriage rates; divorces per
married couple have also fallen by 27% since 1979.
It should be clear that a model positing ever‐increasing technological
change in the household will struggle to adequately describe the decline
in divorce rates that has occurred over the past 30 years. It is worth em-
phasizing that these lower divorce rates reflect more stable marriages. In
particular, figure 4 shows that each vintage of marriages since the 1970s
have been more stable than their predecessors and hence that marital
stability—at each anniversary—has been rising for 30 years.
The role of marriage within the life cycle isalso changing dramatically,
and figure 2 illustrated that in recent years a greater proportion of those
aged 65 years orolder aremarried than at any point in the twentieth cen-
tury. The other great shift is the rising age at first marriage, and figure 5
shows that much of the decline in the proportion of the population mar-
ried reflects delayed marriage. In fact, for men, much of the rising age at
first marriage simply reflects a reversal of the rapid decline in the im-
mediate postwar period. Over the entire century, the median age at first
marriage for men rose from 26 to 27.5. In this broader historical perspective,
Fig. 4. First marriages ending in divorce, by year of marriage. Sources: Calculations by
Stevenson and Wolfers (2008b), based on Survey of Income and Program Participation,
2004 panel, wave 2 Topical Module.
Wolfers 304the relative youth of those marrying in the 1950s looks particularly strik-
ing. For women, the typical age of marriage has risen by nearly 4 years,
and around half of this long‐run rise reflects a narrowing of the typical
age gap between husband and wife.
Even as marriage has been delayed, there remains little evidence that
it is being forgone. The solid lines in figure 6 show the proportion of
40‐year‐old women who have ever married. While some retreat from
marriage is evident in these data, it is important to note that this retreat
is recent, the decline is rather small, and it is largely concentrated among
African American women. A more granular analysis reaching this con-
clusion is developed by Isen and Stevenson (2008).
The final observation that merits emphasis is that these changes in
family form have occurred to different degrees and at different times
across industrialized countries. While Greenwood and Guner provide
some cursory analysis of differences in household size across countries,
their cross‐country analysis undercuts their U.S. time‐series exercise. In
particular,theiranalysisofthe U.S.time seriesdemonstratesthat a20‐fold
decreaseinthepriceofhouseholddurablesisrequiredtoexplainchanges
between 1950 and 2000, a period in which average household size de-
clinedfrom2.14to1.65.Thistime‐seriesdeclineinrelativepricesisabout
100 times larger thanthe cross‐country variation inthe price ofhousehold
Fig. 5. Median age of first marriage, 1900–2007. Source: U.S. Census Bureau (2007a)
Comment 305appliances,whichliewithinarangeofabout20%(seetheirfig.10).Given
this, it isdifficult to see how similar forces couldexplain more than a tiny
fraction of the large cross‐countryvariation in household size. Moreover,
given the rough similarity across countries in the shocks to household
technology, it is difficult to see how Greenwood and Guner’s analysis
could reconcile the very different time series across countries.
V. An Alternative Story
Finally, let me sketch an alternative to the Greenwood and Guner story,
which I suspect is more easily reconciled with these stylized facts
(drawing heavily from Stevenson and Wolfers [2008a]). Our character-
ization begins with the prewar period, which we believe is well char-
acterized by a Beckerian model of marriage, emphasizing production
complementarities (Becker 1981). Under this view, families were like
small firms, and marriage facilitated productive gains due to specializa-
tion, with husbands typically specialized in market work and with their
wives specialized in the domestic sphere. This model yielded the intriguing
insight that opposites attract, since men who were successful in the mar-
ket placed a high premium on women who were likely to be particularly
Fig. 6. Marital status of 40‐year‐old women by race, 1900–2005. Sources: Decennial
census, 1900–2000; American Community Survey, 2001–5, combined to form final data
point.
Wolfers 306productive in the home. In turn, marriage was not particularly valuable
for career‐minded women, which is consistent with low marriage rates
among highly educated women in the prewar period.
Subsequent shocks have reduced the value of these production com-
plementarities. Specific examples include a shift in gender norms that
may be traced back to wartime efforts to engage women in market work
(“Rosie the riveter”), declining labor market discrimination against women,
and the emergence of the contraceptive pill (which made investing in fe-
male education a safer bet). The forces identified by Greenwood and
Guner are also surely important, as the price of household capital goods
fell. Technological change in the household may also have been “unskill‐
biased,” as dishwashers and washing machines have transformed skill‐
intensive tasks into fairly straightforward tasks. The expanded reach of
themarketintofoodpreparationplaysasimilarrole.Bythisview,declin-
ing returns to investing in household skills reduce the value of speciali-
zation, and the forces identified as important in the Beckerian model of
marriage have become decreasingly important.
What then drives modern marriage? Today’s “hedonic marriage” re-
flects a shift from the family as a forum for shared production to shared
consumption. In particular, love and companionship—or “consumption
complementarities”—are increasingly valuable in an era of rising life ex-
pectancy and increased leisure. This idea is consistent with observed
changes in the character of modern marriages (Coontz 2006) and also
with the increasing trend toward likes increasingly marrying likes (by
age, education, and occupation). Today’s households are also less
child‐centric, and only 41% of married couples currently have own chil-
dren present in their household, down from 75% in 1880. And while
“productive marriage” was particularly valuable for women with few
market skills, “hedonic marriage” offers less to the low‐skilled, which
may explain the retreat from marriage among less educated women
documented by Isen and Stevenson (2008).
By this account, the sharp uptick in divorce in the 1960s and early
1970s reflects a transition, as those who had married the right partner
for the old specialization model of marriage found themselves paired
with the wrong partner for today’s modern hedonic marriage. But those
marryinginthe1980sand1990sunderstoodthisnewmodelofmarriage,
c h o s et h e i rp a r t n e r sa c c o r d i n g l y ,a n dh a v ee n j o y e dm o r es t a b l em a r -
riages. Consequently, divorce rates have fallen, and those marrying to-
day are less likely to divorce than their parents. The decline in divorce
rates is yet to show much evidence of slowing down, suggesting that
we are still some years from the new steady state.
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1. Indeed, this is a point made explicitly by the authors, who note that “the matching
parameters, μs, σs, μm, σm, and ρ, do not even enter into the Lmð Þ and Lsð Þ functions.”
That is, the time allocation decisions of households (Lm measures time in the market if
married; Ls, market time if single)—which is a function of their productive uses in the
market, at home, or when enjoying leisure—are entirely independent of the model of
marriage and divorce.
2. This sentence uses the data from Greenwood and Guner’s table 3. However their
“fraction married” actually refers to the proportion of nonwidowed women aged
18–64 who are married. Figure 2 illustrates that this is much higher than the fraction of
all adult women who are married. Further, my own calculations suggest that the fraction
of nonwidowed women aged 18–64 who were married is only 78% rather than their 82%
number.
3. Formally, they assume bt ¼ ρbt 1 þð 1   ρÞμm þ σm
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
1   ρ2
p
ξt, with ξt∼Nð0;1Þ. With
ρ ¼ 0, this simplifies to bt ∼ Nðμs; σsÞ in the first year of marriage and b ∼ Nðμm; σmÞ in
subsequent years, as in my eqq. (3) and (4).
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